About this Edition
"Cartels" by Wendell Berge is a legal-economic treatise written in the mid-20th century. It argues that international industrial cartels operate as “private governments” that suppress competition, slow technological progress, inflate prices, and even endanger democratic institutions and national security. Drawing on antitrust cases and congressional records, it contends that cartel power—often organized around patent controls and market-sharing pacts, notably with German combines—has warped foreign trade and public policy. The work promises detailed case studies across key sectors to advocate vigorous antitrust enforcement and broader public access to technology. The opening of this work frames the postwar economic opportunity against the central obstacle of cartel power, with the author explaining his sources in Justice Department actions and Senate investigations. Early chapters chart the shift from domestic trusts to globally coordinated cartels, portray cartels as instruments that aided German militarism, and show how they restricted output, adulterated quality, manipulated patents, and created war-critical shortages. The discussion then ties cartel practices to foreign policy setbacks—especially in Latin America—and cites the 1939 Düsseldorf meeting as emblematic of plans to “rationalize” world trade through private agreements. A chapter on technology shows how monopolies channel and choke research, illustrated by internal memos and deals (Standard Oil’s 100‑octane dilem
Subjects & Topics
MonopoliesRestraint of tradeTrusts, Industrial
